Monday, March 8, 2010
Part of My World? Only Partially.
His discussion of the alleged evils of public spending, however, is especially relevant in the modern world. He says: “In one branch of the conventional wisdom, the American economy is never far removed from socialism, and the movement toward socialism may be measured by the rise in public spending” (111). Though he makes a legitimate point in connecting the fear of “social revolution” (111) to government-driven production via public spending, his division of ‘conventional wisdom’ into different branches undermines his overall goal. As was mentioned in class, this suggests a weakness with the general notion of ‘conventional wisdom’. Though it became the kernel for which the entire book was known, the concept he ultimately presents does veer slightly from the initial image of overarching, unified social thought. The indubitable truth of his statement regarding public spending overshadows the weakness in his definition of ‘conventional wisdom’; in fact, the unfortunate prevalence of this argument today lends even more credibility to a sense of ‘conventional wisdom’. To me, Galbraith’s text is a mix of these types of assertions: some poignantly descriptive and aware, others irrelevant in the face of a vastly different modern age.
Katie (Katherine) Carroll
SID #19573684
Precis - The High Road: The Polemics of Non-Polemicism
In chapter 17 of The Affluent Society, Galbraith promotes the development and maintenance of “social balance,” a term which “suggests a satisfactory relationship between the supply of privately produced goods and services and those of the state” (189). This term, along with the primary argumentative method employed in its legitimization as a societal objective, exemplifies the rhetorical strategy that makes Galbraith so compelling. Galbraith’s strategy consists of creating the impression that he is knowledgeable, yet uniquely impartial, concerning economic matters. His ostensibly careful analysis of historical events, paired with statements that make use of disarming terms like “balance,” “suggests,” and “satisfactory” make it difficult for the reader to disagree with him on logical bases (I’m using “disarming” to convey the sense that the critical reader finds it difficult to antagonistically engage with the text, due to the tempered, non-inflammatory nature of its language). Galbraith works to convince his audience that, amongst those of comparable erudition, he is exceptionally capable of gauging the merit of arguments others have made, appropriating the components of such arguments which contemporary circumstances have allowed to prevail, and synthesizing them in a way that sheds some light on contemporary circumstances.
Even narrowing our scope to economic discourse, it would be foolish to argue that Galbraith was the first to assume the non-polemical position in order to render his work all the more convincing, by dint of the presumed objectivity associated with non-polemical writing. Galbraith, himself, identifies a similar device operating in Marx’s writings in chapter 6 of The Affluent Society, titled “The Marxian Pall.” However, Marx’s writings were of an unabashedly prophetic nature and this left his work vulnerable not only to the scathing critiques of his contemporaries, but those of subsequent generations as well. The efficacy of Galbraith’s approach rests in his ability to lay bare the flawed economic doctrines that give rise to various forms of conventional wisdom without imposing any explicit or otherwise conspicuous projections for the future on the basis of such errors. Galbraith asserts, “Ideas are inherently conservative. They yield…to the massive onslaught of circumstance with which they cannot contend” (17). Thus, Galbraith rhetorically shields himself and his own ideas within the text from the anachronistic critique that has plagued Marx’s writings. This is not to say that Galbraith resists the temptation to offer his own economic remedies. The Affluent Society is not a historical text, nor does it approach its subject with the scientific rigor that one might be led to believe. Galbraith’s interprets circumstances in a manner that allows him to forward an embedded agenda, while making it appear as if his conclusions are products of well-reasoned inductive, rather than deductive, analysis.
In chapter 17, his argument inhabits a space outside of, not inbetween, two ideologies that he quite conveniently terms “liberal” and “conservative”: “Liberals are obliged to argue that the services be paid for by progressive taxation which will reduce inequality…Conservatives rally to the defense of inequality – although without ever quite committing themselves in such uncouth terms – and oppose the use of income taxes” (195). To my knowledge, the most common pattern of argumentation within economic discourse – and, for that matter, all discourses I am familiar with – consists of developing a stark Manichean juxtaposition of two entities, and then proceeding to aggrandize the “good” and pummel the “evil.” By shunning both, Galbraith makes takes the high road, seeming to set partisanship aside and view the issue objectively. He explains, “Since the debate over inequality cannot be resolved, the money is frequently not appropriated and the service not performed. It is a casualty of the economic goals of both liberals and conservatives, for both of whom the questions of social balance are subordinate to those of production and, when it is evoked, of inequality” (195). Galbraith argues against both sides of the argument, claiming that they are misguided in their objectives. His argument functions most effectively when this high road-mentality is en vogue, as it most certainly is within our current political and academic climates.Ali (Nima) Rad
Oh no he didn't... ('Free' to Choose)
"As a result, the century from Waterloo to the First World War was one of the most peaceful in human history among Western nations, marred only by some minor wars - the Crimean War and the Franco-Prussian Wars are the most memorable - and, of course, a major civil war within the United States, which itself a result of the major respect - slavery - in which the United States departed from economic and political freedom." - page 52
Is he saying that slavery itself was a departure from economic and political freedom, and the Civil War was the result of (violent disagreements over) slavery? Or is he saying that the end of slavery was the departure from economic and political freedom (inasmuch as slaves were considered private property, the policies that the Civil War enforced on the South were tyrannical impositions on the free market in which slaves were an important commodity)?
Because I can really see it going either way, which is to say, I think this guy just really did just make a free-market argument against the abolition of slavery.
Precis: Events, Ideas, and Economic Security in Chapter Eight of John Galbraith's THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY
As the chapter begins, Galbraith notes that within the “model of competitive society…insecurity was inherent,” going on to mark that the insecurity caused by “unpredictable changes in fortune were both inevitable and useful” (81). Its inevitability came from its part in the system’s capacity to “accommodate itself to change” and its utility from its ability to drive the best and most efficient service out of men (81). However, Galbraith also notes that these seemingly valuable aspects of insecurity were hardly regarded as inherently indispensable by individuals but as an abstract idea. The issue at hand is that, although insecurity seems desirable within a theoretical model of society, when actually faced, those subject to insecurity will at some point attempt to relieve the sense of instability which it inherently produces; and, as Galbraith concludes in the opening of the text, “as with individuals so too with nations” (1). In fact, according to Galbraith, society-at-large has been largely been successful at eliminating insecurity. However, it has “survived more or less intact in the ideological underpinning of the conventional wisdom” and, as such, continues to influence economic thought and practice. (82-83).
Economic insecurity’s elimination was intensely incited by the behavior of corporations, at least during the period wherein the conventional wisdom followed the competitive model of society. Corporations and the businessmen running them reacted to the great insecurities of competitive capitalism (i.e. competition and the free-flow of market prices) by attempting to ensure full control of supply and price within each respective corporate body (83). However, focusing the majority of their attentions on price, corporations misunderstood their efforts to reduce risk as a “maximization of profits” rather than as a “minimization of risks” (83). How did this misunderstanding come about?
What Galbraith seems to get at is that society-at-large tends to react in particular ways to particular events, generating particular interpretive ideas regarding said events. However, at some point in the historical trajectory of a given event and its subsequent effects, a change occurs in events: essentially, the trajectory reaches a conclusion, an end-point—opening up a space for a new trajectory. Yet, the ideas generated by society-shifting events persist beyond this point, as a result of the general degeneration of a particular event’s influence on a society divorced from the intensity of the initial experience of that event: which is to say that, once ideas are generated to interpret an event, they are used to generate action—action designed to cope with the effects of that event, eventually ameliorating society from said effects.
Juxtaposing this interpretation of Galbraith’s general claim about the nature of economic and social life with the chapter “Economic Security,” one can see that, in the case of the Great Depression, society-at-large responded quite actively to the period’s extreme economic insecurity: corporations sought to control prices an supply through self-saving measures, the government began unemployment and social security benefits, microeconomic as well as macroeconomic measures were utilized throughout the period to ensure economic security and stability (84-87). As has been stated above, however, conventional wisdom saw many of these measures as profit-increasing rather than insecurity-reducing actions. Conventional wisdom, at this point in contemporary history, was firmly in the mold of a competitive society, wherein depressions were seen as inevitable and useful. However, this was a mold generated for an explanation of a society in far different economical and socio-historical circumstances than the society of the Depression Era: standards of living increased, the life of the average man no longer teetered so close to the verge of death. The stringent demarcations of wealth and possibility were no longer so clear.
At some point, society shifted from accepting the competitive model of society as the fact of life to accepting a need for economic security as society’s preeminent pursuit in life. Yet again society shifted during the Great Depression from a belief that depressions were inevitable and useful, an idea incompatible with the catastrophic event of this depression—marking an end in the competitive model’s dominance in describing society—to a “widespread belief that depressions could be at least partially prevented” (87): which is to say that economic security could be reached and maintained. As Galbraith himself states, “One cannot stress too strongly…that if economic security is to be considered finished business…depression and inflation must be prevented” (92). However, as is made apparent once the relationship between events and the ideas meant to interpret them is made clear, the cycle does not end here. Galbraith goes on in the chapter to expose the problems of this new conventional wisdom or “eventful idea.” As more depressions occur and are dealt with and surpassed, the general intensity of their influence on society will lessen; thus, there will grow an ever-elongating disconnect between the ideas of conventional wisdom and the actual effects of events in contemporary society (91-93), leading to yet another shift in societal thought. What seems most notable about Galbraith’s concept of this pattern in society is that its products (i.e. the ideas meant to interpret events) are used by man in a seemingly reverse-fashion than how it actually is generated.
Galbraith seems to believe that events lead to ideas, which lead to action, while human beings take action as generated by ideas, which come out of events. It would seem to work out fine, since, in this dissection, man seems to respond to events through action, which is supported by ideas interpreting the event. However, as has been stated previously, the event loses its vitality in relation to ideas and actions, which come as a result of that event but far more indirectly than the period’s initial responses. At this moment, actions are taken with the guidance of ideas, which no longer apply to the event they are meant to interpret. It would seem to follow that these new ideas actually express the movement of society in between events. However, without a notable event to make apparent the disconnect between new ideas and past events, society’s confusion remains, paving the way for yet another catastrophic societal event, perpetuating this paradoxical pattern of societal behavior.
-Michael Woo
Sign Your Precises
Sunday, March 7, 2010
Precis: Galbraith's Pretense of Nonpartisanship
The ambiguous notion of conventional wisdom appears frequently through The Affluent Society representing the epitome of backwards thinking and the ultimate deterrent against the economic enlightenment of our society. Galbraith earlier claims that he does not wish to attach to the conventional wisdom a "wholly invidious connotation" (15), but in the course of his argument, he does not hesitate to treat the notion of conventional wisdom in a thoroughly demeaning and devaluing manner. For instance, when he states an idea that he believes to be particularly obvious, such as the fact that technological progress is an important means to increase production, he says, "even in the conventional wisdom, no one questions" (103) this obvious conclusion, in a way that implies that the proponents of the conventional wisdom are the lowest common denominator in economic theory and intellectual inquiry in general. Galbraith's merciless treatment of the conventional wisdom is, however, central to the success of The Affluent Society, since it serves as an ideological punching bag that is equally identified with both liberals and conservatives, but the effect of being identified with both sides means that neither side has to actually take responsibility for the erroneous conclusions Galbraith often attributes to the conventional wisdom. Whenever he does refer to "the conventional wisdom of liberals" or "the conventional wisdom of conservatives," he never fails to malign both, so as to avoid any appearance of partisanship.
Galbraith maintains this pretense of neutral, nonpartisan intellectual inquiry throughout the book, but in the closing chapters when he begins to make recommendations as to what course of action the affluent society should pursue, it becomes clear that he is promoting a thoroughly leftist agenda. The rationale for his suggested course of action is not in itself lacking, but it is unarguably strengthened by the fact that Galbraith's earlier conclusions concerning the obsolescence of production as a measure of success have been rationally sound and nonpartisan, and to a degree it is assumed that the rest of his arguments will follow in that manner.
King and Marx in Galbraith
Using Galbraith’s notion of conventional wisdom and his summing up of Marx’s theoretical interaction with capitalism, I am going to examine King’s speech, “A Time to Break Silence”. It is clear to me that King is challenging the dominant conventional wisdom of his time since he taking up the “task of opposing the government’s policy” and, more to the point, speaking out with concern for Vietnamese who are possible communists. This demonstrates a clear break with the c.w. of his time since the communist theory and its followers were held up as the ideological and actual enemy of the United States.
Galbraith articulates conventional wisdom as “ideas which are esteemed at anytime for their acceptability” and that which “protects the community” (pg. 8). As we discussed in our last class meeting, he doesn’t seem to be interested in what makes the ideas that make up the conventional wisdom acceptable; he only emphasizes that these firmly gripped ideas prevent the public from seeing an alternative and more original idea. He also doesn’t actually explain why the alternative and more original idea will be better. It appears that we should see originality itself as the cite of improvement on the conventional idea, if only because the conventional is boring. However, he doesn’t think new thinking can actually alter conventional wisdom, only the “march of events” (pg.11). In other words, conventional wisdom-the barrier it is to originality and presumably social progress-unable to be changed before it is too late, succumbs to the “impact of circumstance” (pg. 13).
This is problematized as a coherent notion of social thought and progress in Galbraith’s treatment of Marxist theory. In chapter two, Galbraith made clear that c.w. is adjusted and updated to drastic circumstances (events) that wrest it from its secure resting place in the minds of the corresponding public. It is not at all clear what he means by “circumstances” or “events” but he is clear that an idea is not one of either. This makes it confusing later when he takes about Marx’s theory undermining and altering the conventional wisdom. Seeing as how he talks about this intervention as one that occurred in the realm of sociopolitical discourse-clearly a realm of ideas-it is contradictory that it would qualify as a candidate for c.w. disruption.
Galbraith says that c.w. is that which “protects the community” without articulating which community is protected and from what. In King’s speech it is clear the conventional wisdom he is challenging is not protecting and is instead devastating many communities, particularly the black, the poor and the Vietnamese. Also, King calls into question the aggressive fear that surrounds the idea of communism and cites it as a primary motivator for the Vietnam War. What we notice in the thinking around the Vietnam War is that the notion of a communist power structure was terrifying for many reasons to the United States power structure and its allies resulting in a violent military engagement. This in my mind underscores the chief flaw in Galbraith’s idea of conventional wisdom in that he treats the circumstances of the world as happening apart from the implementation of or entanglement with the beliefs that make up the conventional wisdom.
Love,
Dre
Incoherent Events within a Shifting History: The Draping of Don Draper
In an episode of Mad Men, Don Draper attempts to give his father-in-law five dollars after the old man realizes and complains that his money went missing. “You people,” says the aggravated grandfather after being offered reimbursement for the lost money, “You think money is the answer to every problem.” “No,” says a disingenuous Draper, “Just this particular problem.” And this, my dear wolfpack, is one simplified exemplification of the relationship between the conventional wisdom and the reproblematization of concerns in modern economic theory.
The identification of John Galbraith’s conventional wisdom, as the conceptual category for the ideas that take commonplace acceptance in a particular historical situation, with the father-in-law’s perspective of traditional fiscal responsibility, one that presupposes a particular understanding of money’s social designation, is the implication of creating such a category to create similarities and distinctions in the discourse of our modern economic reality (a concept that must also be interrogated and reevaluated). On one level, one can say that the aforementioned scene in Mad Men closely resembles Galbraith’s articulation of the emergence of the leisure class, and the conceptual changes that were implicated within the discourse arising from such a class distinction. Here, the value and meaning of money has changed from a moment in history where the unequivocal relationship between money and survival was tantamount to survival itself, to a modern displacement of value in consumer markets. Yet, the conventional wisdom has with its identifications numerous disidentifications that are implicit in such totalizing characterizations of economic behavior, which holds such concepts susceptible to moments of unintelligibility, incoherence, and irresoluteness in the face of a changing, fluid reality. In rendering a version of history that promises to resolve itself through an ordering of knowledge, how does Galbraith ensure that the space occupied by the conventional wisdom remains intact through various historical transformations? How does the conventional wisdom become integral in explaining these complex economic processes? What are in question here are the qualities allowing the conventional wisdom to overcome preemptive disqualifications, and the ways in which it fails to accomplish this task.
Our point of departure begins with Galbraith’s analysis of the way in which the conventional wisdom failed to understand the modern concern for security coinciding with a fetish for stability. The argument, here, contends that the conventional wisdom takes as an assumption the importance of insecurity in insuring high levels of productivity, and that this assumption translates to characterizing security in terms of the risks and hazards of modern economic life. Since the conventional wisdom opposes governmental assistance on the basis that such policies encourage idleness and unproductive behavior, the drive for productivity, under this perspective, stems solely from unfettered competition. Yet, the mere existence of social security programs proves that this conservatism is false, considering the remarkable rates of growth that followed the security imperatives of the 1930s. The limitation on the number of risks available in economic life turned the conventional wisdom obsolete by recognizing the ability of contemporary society to meet levels of subsistence, while generating surpluses conducive to reducing the importance of other risks. Therefore, the mitigation of the “business cycle” has provided the conditions conducive for Don Draper to charitably give grandpa five dollars.
This makes sense: government intervention on maintaining a standard of living through unemployment, old age, and survival pensions reflects the inadequacies of the conventional wisdom to explain security in a modern context. But the availability of identifying the conventional wisdom is possible only when one becomes cognizant of the historical possibilities that surround the concern for security. Following the discourse of economic theory while simultaneously recognizing the fluctuations occurring in reality is the obstacle confronting Galbraith if he is to posit a way of characterizing the complexity of this trajectory that is capable of producing other mobilizations necessary for effective solutions. If we take Galbraith seriously in identifying particular historical moments in their relation to the conventional wisdom, then there exists a possibility in distinguishing these moments in their importance, magnitude, and significance to the future hinging on the proliferation of the “march of ideas”. However, the question of how these identifications are made complicates the understanding of economic discourse through the object that the conventional wisdom attempts to encompass. This is because of the loose association between a complex history and a particular transformative event that the conventional wisdom brings to presence. But if this association is tethered by the articulation of history through the aggregation of particular events, and all of these considerations are located within specific socio-historical imperatives, then the conventional wisdom looses the capacity to generate a coherent history, and is instead situated within another discursive history promulgated by particular liberal motivations.
The distancing of the conventional wisdom of any time period seems to be justified by the liberalization of reality. Galbraith writes that the importance of insecurity to the world preceding our modern one was “cherished almost exclusively either in the second person or in the abstract. Its need was thought urgent for inspiring the efforts of other persons or people in general” (81). There was no one individual who celebrated his or her own insecurity in the presence of scarcity and famine. The distance associated in recognizing the essential nature of insecurity was experienced through the lives of others. Now, the individual was protected by government pensions as opposed to being subjected to the auto-corrective features of a competitive market, which is assumed to be insecurity as perceived through the second person. Since security solved, for the most part, the high risks involved in a volatile market while maintaining an increase in production, the distancing involved in the search for security is mediated by the fact that it has become a finished business, i.e., that the distance has been reconfigured into a separation. Hence, the separation between the individual and specific socio-economic prescriptions become necessary to progress living standards on the basis of an idealized rational individual with particular desires and needs to be satisfied. Analogously, the conventional wisdom depends on a rationalization of history with marked identifications and separations that distances the experience of history and its idealized rendering. What is at stake in presupposing artificial distinctions is the failure to recognize the difficulty in seeing something as both political and economical without subverting one to another’s rationale. If viewed in this way, the conventional wisdom is unable to cognitively map the contemporary situation without referring back to a history whose trajectory would inevitably produce the conditions for the situation’s existence.
For the reasons outlined in this précis, I am reluctant to embrace my own identification of the conventional wisdom through Mad Men. On the one hand, the conventional wisdom easily explains the obsolescence of old belief systems in emerging realities. On the other hand, Don Draper cannot be integrated into the conventional wisdom schema since the cooption of his beliefs has not occurred, or has yet to manifest intelligibly in the form of the conventional wisdom. As such, the possibility for discerning the situation as an event will be obscured so long as the conventional wisdom remains salient in organizing a coherent history. Draper can neither be characterized solely on the basis of an opposition to the conventional wisdom nor as the conventional wisdom itself since Galbraith’s understanding of this concept has obfuscated what the situation could mean, and how it is to be interpreted.
Matthew Nguyen
Chapter 10 - a paradox of production
Chapters 10 presents an alternative argument to the paramount position of production (never mind that a catastrophic march of events is what is required to overturn conventional wisdom, not more arguments). Galbraith says we must justify the flow of goods that result from production, taking into account that we buy things like cars, exotic food, and “erotic clothing” (115). The rationalization of these commodities has to do not with society but with economic science. He says, “the urgency of wants does not diminish appreciably as more of them are satisfied” (117) meaning once basic needs are taken care of there will always be further, psychological needs to satisfy. However, the concept of diminishing marginal utility implies that the 100th piece of bread is less valuable than our first after we’re satiated, and furthermore, that if we move on from bread to yachts, the yacht was less important than the last piece of bread we decided to buy. The effect of this is that with rising affluence and fulfillment of needs is to reduce the importance of production and productivity—the goods we move on to produce are getting less and less important.
However, he presents the counterargument that in order to defend production, which he called the “anchor” of economic thought, the theorist must “divorce economics from any judgment on the goods” (120). It is impossible to say one man’s bread provides more utility than another man’s yacht, and hence cannot say the production that supplies yachts is of lesser urgency.
We’ve arrived at a dichotomy here. On one hand, we can blast the paramount position of production by saying that an ever-onward quest for productivity will result in unnecessary goods, and instead we should focus our resources on supplying immediate needs with the highest utility, and maybe knock out unemployment and build a public school or something too. On the other hand, we can divorce economic theory from social or moral judgment and continue to defend the fact that more goods and more production tends to make everyone happy, and everyone better off. The second option, while attractive and makes the most sense (of course we should apply sound theory to the real world!), is problematic if we consider the fact that the theory must separate itself completely from real world considerations (moral and social) if it is to apply to these condition (moral social conditions) at all. We can create a perfectly elegant economic theory but if it is independent of human concerns, it is a castle in the sky. One man might derive the same amount of utility from a yacht as a man might from a piece of bread—in terms of theory, that is a perfectly valid reason to argue for why we should produce yachts as well as bread. Morally, it would be an outrage for a man to get a yacht while another starves, implying that, while we have starving children in Africa, the entire yacht industry is the devil. Galbraith attempts to ground the castle in the sky to moral and societal concerns by saying that utility derived from owning a yacht would never have existed had one never known yachts to exist. Essentially, the production creates the demand for the product. In such a case, since it is not a naturally desired good, it is not on the same moral level as say bread is needed. Hence the need for production is defended at the same time as we can be satisfied that economic theory is good and moral and will make everyone in society really happy! However, Galbraith never really gets into why a naturally desired good is better than a contrived desire for a yacht because, surprise! Yachts exist! And it’s too late to ignore them so I guess the industry is still the devil if we don’t get rid of it.
Galbraith’s challenge was to tie down an elegant, theoretical, economic system to real world morals and society, and his solution to navigating that dichotomy was to create an arbitrary combination of the two systems (some wants are contrived and therefore less valid), in order to avoid a more distasteful mash-up of the two (that some wants are less valid if you’re rich). I may have missed his point somewhere but essentially my thoughts are that there is an interesting dichotomy between pure, utilitarian economic theory where the economist just wants to maximize utility, and the system that we use on Earth where we would be angry if all utility were the same and we were purely utilitarian. This dichotomy leads to an interesting paradox, where if economic theory is to exist or succeed at all, it must necessarily divorce itself from the very societal considerations it seeks to solve. Imagine the economist who tries to publish a theory, but his friend asks him, “hey I really need an advance on my paycheck cause of circumstances beyond my control and I’m a really good guy and deserve it whereas this asshole stole my ipod the other day, so give guys like me a little boost in your solution for our economy. Thanks bud.” It would never work. Rand would agree and she would be right for once. Economic theory is divorced from what it tries to solve. How does Galbraith navigate that paradox? How does he establish the connection or legitimacy of his theorizing and the way that it will play out in reality? How can he justify a book that goes against the “conventional wisdom”? I’d say he doesn’t quite succeed in all of these points, but he does do a good job of exposing those problems in a way that impresses us, then sidesteps them (while we are entranced by his grandfatherly genius) in a way that makes us believe he is settling them.
I’d love to hear if perhaps I misinterpreted his argument, or missed something.
The Balance
The Balance
In Chapter 17, entitled “The Theory of Social Balance,” of John Kenneth Galbraith’s The Affluent Society, he spends some time, as well as his imagination, in exploring the real and potential threats posed by a disjunction between the societal aspects of private and public workings, mainly with private goods and public services. In the beginning he sets up the chapter with a declaration of our failure “to see the importance, indeed the urgent need, of maintaining a balance between the two” (Galbraith, 186). Following this statement, he guides us in our imaginative understanding of this failure by offering up a futuristic, yet frighteningly believable, story/glance, into the scene of an upper-class American family on their way to camp out and enjoy the American countryside, that is decayed to a point of it posing as “a menace to public health and morals” (188). He steps in further to suggest their reflections at the end of this leisurely stroll to be “on the curious unevenness of their blessings,” and then he turns the attention towards us, as the readers, by asking, “Is this, indeed, the American genius?” (188).
From my first read of this chapter, its overall argument for balance, its warnings about imbalance, and its almost explicit references to other works we have been reading in this class seemed all very obvious. There is the quote pulled straight out of Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom at the end of the chapter; there is even mention of peace time economies and markets as well as public spending on defense, which stood in contrast, rather in non-satirical agreement with Lewin’s Report from Iron Mountain. However, this chapter, from its very title, calls me back to Eisenhower’s Farewell Address.
Although I am not certain if Galbraith uses the term balance more times than Eisenhower, both strive to make the warning clear that the failure to maintain or achieve a balance will have negative effects on society. Eisenhower stresses “the need to maintain balance in and among national programs, balance between the private and the public economy, balance between the cost and hoped for advantages, balance between the clearly necessary and the comfortably desirable, balance between our essential requirements as a nation and the duties imposed by the nation upon the individual” (Eisenhower, 1). Unlike Eisenhower’s more serious tone in his address and warnings to the country, Galbraith flowers his text with hints of sarcasm and implicit jabs at more neoliberal theorists. For instance, in describing residents of a city, he says that they “should have a nontoxic supply of air suggests no revolutionary dalliance with socialism” (187). In this way, Galbraith is anticipating the neo-liberalist and neo-conservative critique, their fearing a situation in which the public services would overwhelm and dominate private and individual capacity. In another example discussing potentially realistic conditions concerning sanitation services, Galbraith points out that “the counterpart of increasing opulence will be deepening filth. The greater the wealth, the thicker will be the dirt” (190). Galbraith’s method in offering several somewhat elementary examples of things to consider when discussing the merits of maintaining the “Social Balance” (189), as he calls it, seems much more effective than Eisenhower’s words of warning despite the ethos of a former President. Or perhaps this is the cause of my interpretive cynicism. In any case, the different rhetorical operations used by Galbraith and Eisenhower both strive for a similar argument; keeping the balance.
The third of Eisenhower’s aforementioned balancing acts, between the necessary and the leisurely stands in most harmonious conversation with Galbraith’s initial story about the upper class American family. In this scene Galbraith paints, water is polluted and the air has “the stench of decaying refuse” (188), with the family being oblivious as to how their cherished American countryside is no longer another of their blessings. In relation to Eisenhower’s claim, the “comfortably desirable” has not completely collapsed due to its imbalance or sacrifice and subjugation of the “clearly necessary.” Galbraith writes “All private wants, where the individual can choose, are inherently superior to all public desires which must be paid for by taxation and with an inevitable component of compulsion” (198). With the obvious disadvantage that public desires has to deal with, is there any chance of restoring this and doing away with the hierarchy? Or does such a hoped for balance offset the possibility of horizontality because of the need for someone to act in maintaining the balance, in other words, working against the unruly private, individual desires? Or is it possible that although the circumstances do not seem favourable, Galbraith’s portrait of the family is a scene where the private or the individual is able to overcome such public decay and “social disorder” (Galbraith, 193)? If one were to believe that public or collective efforts could still lead to such societal and environmental destruction, then is this enough of an argument for private desires and capacity to reign supreme over the possible menace of public (governmental) power? If this is the “American genius” then hopefully, as Galbraith ends the chapter with, it is because “men of high position are allowed, by a special act of grace, to accommodate their reasoning to the answer they need. Logic is only required in those of lesser rank” (199).
"Why is Ayn Rand such a Hideous Bitch?" - A Precis by Evan Wilder
Galbraith introduces the notion of Conventional Wisdom in Chapter Two to shed some light on why people hold the particular opinions that they do in the social and economic arenas, despite the fact that they may well be erroneous. Essentially, Galbraith traces this problem back to a discrepancy in “the relation between events and the ideas which interpret them” (6). Events occur in the world, and then people – being sentient creatures – ruminate upon them. Of these two ontological levels, the latter could be thought of as more subjective; its failure to be aligned with the more objective former is cast by Galbraith as an important source of socioeconomic malaise. Instead of doing the intellectual work necessary to wrangle events into intelligibility, people end up adopting a conventional wisdom to explain them, gobbling up certain ideas because they are “acceptable” rather than taking the bitter medicine proffered by reality.
The only way this pattern is broken is when the two levels clash so violently that the particular ideas comprising the conventional wisdom can no longer be reasonably understood to contain the events of the world. Nature, abhorring a vacuum as it does, soon replaces the former conventional wisdom with new ideas, ideally more aligned with the “march of events” than those previously expressed by the conventional wisdom. Galbraith states this as follows:
“The fatal blow to the conventional wisdom comes when the conventional ideas fail signally to deal with some contingency to which obsolescence has made them palpably inapplicable” (11). No longer able to skirt responsibility, intransigent children have their medicine crammed down their ungrateful gullets and –in spite of themselves – find themselves cured of the aforementioned socioeconomic malaise. Huzzah!
The plot of Atlas Shrugged plays out in a remarkably similar way. Rand paints a dystopian portrait of an anemic world made ill by overconsumption of conventional wisdom. If the people would only leave their fearful parlors and go outside, they might see that the world was different than the one they had imagined it to be. But no, like Galbraith, Rand realizes that ideas alone lack the dynamism to dislocate other ideas. Dagny Taggart and Hank Reardon are considered eccentric and outlandish for their proactive, aggressively individualistic attitudes. Like Galbraith, Rand sees the fear that freezes the James Taggarts and Wesley Mouches into paralytic complacency. And like Galbraith, Rand requires a massive event – in this case a strike – to expose the conventional wisdom for the deformed effigy that it is. For Galbraith, “At this stage, the irrelevance will often be dramatized by some individual…In fact, he will only have crystallized in words what the events have made clear” (11). This individual, in Atlas Shrugged, takes the form of John Galt, using his monologue to crystallize what Dagny and Reardon have inchoately felt for a long time. Namely, the stagnation brought about by conventional wisdom: “There are also grave drawbacks and even dangers in a system of thought which by its very nature and design avoids accommodation to circumstances until change is dramatically forced upon it” (16). It’s the weakness that comes from the unnecessary use of a crutch; it’s gangrenous bedsores on the sedentary carcass of a bedridden hypochondriac; it’s atrophy in the limbs of livestock crammed into industrial slaughterhouses. It’s ugly, and grotesque, and not what you want to see when you look into a mirror. But for some reason, it’s palatable in Galbraith and not in Rand.
Precis: The Position of Poverty
SID: 18467768
In Chapter 22 of *The Affluent Society,* Galbraith addresses the question of poverty and its place in the a society that produces more than it can use. This question is an especially sensitive one insofar as it informs not only the foundations of our economic assumptions, but those of our moral understanding as well. Galbraith recognizes poverty as both the necessary statistical under-girding of a capitalistic society, and negatively as the criteria for membership in such a society (that is, he sees the ways in which the poor are ispo facto excluded from from such a society.) Although it does not seem that he is comfortable with either aspect of poverty as it is taken up in 20th-century American culture, his discomfort fails to resolve into any compelling suggestions for fixing the problems of poverty (although the failure of his observations to persuade may itself be taken as evidence for their correctness.)
Galbraith begins by characterizing the poor; unlike those for whom "wants must be synthesized" (i.e. the New Class of the Affluent Society) "... [the poor] are much closer to physical need." (234) "Poverty", he says, "survives in economic discourse partly as buttress to conventional economic wisdom" (235) yet it survives materially as "limited and insufficient food," "poor living standards," crowded, cold, and dirty shelter" (235), and at least in part as a result of the conventional economic wisdom for which it serves as a buttress. In this moment in the text, we see Galbraith struggling to propose a vision of poverty that can provide an alternative account to the CW, without merely reproducing it. On the one hand, he is aware of the role that the poverty has played in justifying the discourses that perpetuate it as a physical reality. On the other hand, he recognizes that his own treatment of poverty is discursive as well. So while he wants to liberate the poor from their role as the bondsmen of their oppressors' rhetoric, I think we can read some uneasiness in his treatment of their plight, which is couched in terms taken from a Romantic tradition in which poverty, misery, and injustice are taken as self-evidently synonymous.
Perhaps it is this discomfort with the moral valences of his own diction which causes Galbraith to make a distinction between what he calls "case poverty," in which individuals or individual households are unable to reap the benefits of the affluent society as a result of what are basically personal handicaps, and "insular poverty," in which entire communities are excluded from affluence by what is presumably a more systemic (and thus less blameworthy) obstacles. At first it appears that Galbraith introduces this distinction as a way of salvaging one subclass of the poor from the moral condemnation that is their fate under the CW, while at the same justifying the way of thinking that regards the poverty as the manifestation of moral inferiority. In short, insular poverty is society's fault, while case poverty is the indivdual's. Galbraith is not so quick to complicate this distinction as I want him to be, and focuses most of the rest of the chapter making the case for alleviating insular poverty through what amounts to an increase in public services aimed at incorporating the poor into "participation in the economic life of the larger community."* (242)
Still, Galbraith does eventually concede that case poverty is is not "entirely resistant to such remedies. Much can be done" (by some publicly funded agency, presumably) "to treat those characteristics which cause people to reject or be rejected by the modern industrial society." Thus in terms of proposal that Galbraith's argument makes, the case poverty and insular poverty fall under the same category and can both be alleviated by the same sorts of actions. This concession is not as weak as it at first seems; the conflation of these two subclasses of poverty follows necessarily from the warrant that supports and legitimizes all of Galbraith's claims concerning poverty. The mobilizing assumption behind much of this book seems to be something like: a society must provide all of its members with the means to participate as full moral members in it, and a society defined by its affluence must therefore extend the privileges of affluence to all of its members, at least to some minimal degree.
Galbraith understands equality to be an end in itself for societies, but notes that because the very poor no longer constitute a majority of the population, the political advantage of campaigning in their interest is marginal at best.(238-239) Still, he argues that we have a moral obligation to eradicate the poverty that keeps those in its influence from enjoying full membership in our society. Thus the distinction between insular and case poverty, which initially looked to be a real moral distinction, breaks down because the imperative to incorporate the poor into society is not moral in the same way. Even though there probably is some percentage of society that is "worthless" and incapable of contributing to society, the state of insular poverty makes this group practically impossible to distinguish from those who are denied this opportunity by forces beyond their control. And even if one could make this distinction, the former group's uselessness would not be taken as evidence of their worthlessness, but as evidence of their even greater need for society's intervention. In other words, Galbraith makes the distinction between case poverty and insular poverty to appease that part of his audience that is still responsive to the conventional moral wisdom (which is most of us, to some degree), yet his proposal for the problem's solution arises from a rationality that is consciously opposed to the CW. This discrepancy is endemic to the work as a whole and is a large part of what makes *The Affluent Society* an interesting read.
*Admittedly, Galbraith concedes that this is "not the main point." (242) Deeply aware of the way in which this argument is dependent upon the terms of the CW, he quickly re-formulates the argument for eliminating poverty in terms of social justice.
The Affluent Society - “The Redress of Balance” Precis
The funds for public goods come from both income and sales taxes. Income taxes provide not only funds for public goods, but also a means to create equality by taxing the rich greater than the poor. The issue that arises with the question of equality is the degree to which equality should be ensured, or more simply how much inequality is acceptable and even desired. Because of political tension the attempt to decrease inequality has been achieved not by raising the taxes of the wealthy, but by lowering the taxes of the poor which then decreases the government’s ability to fund programs to decrease inequity among people. Despite the seemingly obvious goals of public programs and taxation the liberal, who argues for them, will align themselves closer with the vague goal of social balance. The term social balance is ambiguous, both in Galbraith’s argument and in the real world. Social balance seems to refer to the desire for less inequality, more economic balance between the rich and the poor, and to the desire for a primarily economic stability in society. The use of the term balance falsely supposes that even when there is not a direct effort for a completely equal distribution of wealth there is some natural balance of distribution of the wealth of public goods that should be worked for. It is unclear what degree of inequality is acceptable or who should have more wealth and who should have less. Sales taxes are often used because although they do not in any way contribute to social balance, they provide a way to avoid having to clearly define social balance or the desirable degree of social balance while funding the public goods to contribute to social balance.
Sales taxes are reviled because of how sales taxes affect those who buy little and those who are able to and choose to purchase many goods by the same percent cost per good purchased. Galbraith argues that even with this apparent inequality of economic pressure sales taxes place on the poor versus the rich, sales taxes are a function of social balance because they provide the resources to fund programs for decreasing inequality. The liberal then who opposes the sales tax is the enemy of social balance, which Galbraith argues is necessary for decreasing poverty. The liberal argues for the income tax, in part at least, because “income taxes... have, in addition, their role as built-in stabilizers of the economy. As incomes fall, the personal tax, through the mechanism of the progressive rates, automatically reduces itself.” unlike sales taxes the effects of income taxes are not equal; they are proportionate (Galbraith 231). The political potential of sales taxes to fund public goods to contribute to social balance should not be ignored, according to Galbraith, who seems to view them as more politically viable than income taxes.
The end of this chapter discusses how it is impossible to know when one has reached social balance and how the uncertainty of social balance is a mark of the affluent society we live in. Social balance is described as the, “satisfaction of private and public needs” (Galbraith 233). Galbraith further describes social balance as when, “the opulence of our private consumption will no longer be in contrast with the poverty of our school, the unloveliness and congestion of our cities, our inability to get to work without struggle and the social disorder that is associated with imbalance.” (Galbraith 233). The fact that social balance is undefinable and unmeasurable perpetuates the liberal attempt through conventional wisdom to solve the issue of poverty. Because there is no definable end goal in the pursuit of social balance, the liberal ascribing to the conventional wisdom always has a purpose: creation and increased social balance. Nothing is really accomplished in this pursuit, but the continuation of the pursuit.
This chapter seems especially aimed at the liberal member of the affluent society who at once disdains poverty and at the same time does not make any real efforts to redress poverty. “The Redress of Balance” seeks to force its reader to re-examine their own complacency in their ideas about how redress poverty. Poverty is taken by the assumed liberal reader and the author as something that needs to be, at least partially, eliminated from society and the methods to reduce poverty, and thereby increase equality, are also agreed upon. The text assumes the reader agrees that through public goods, such as schools, hospitals, and a police force issues of poverty can be addressed. The reason such obvious solutions have not been put into place in the necessary degree is because of the complacency of the people and the lack of motivation. I see myself as part of this intended audience, which I believe makes me both more worried about the implications of the text and more eager to find an argument to counter the arguments of the piece to avoid guilt for not taking more action to restore social balance.
Interestingly Galbraith views public goods not simply as desired out of needs of societies but states, “there are large ready-made needs for schools, hospitals, slum clearance and urban redevelopment, sanitation, parks, playgrounds, police and other pressing public services. Of these needs, almost no one must be persuaded. They exist because, as public officials of all kinds and ranks explain each day with practiced skill, the money to provide for them is unavailable.” indicating that public goods like private goods must be argued for. The use of the word because suggests that although there is a need for public goods such as schools and hospitals it must be argued for, like private goods must be advertised for. The text does not address the problem of creating a community where all or a majority of the members agree on the need for a public good. In situations of great inequality it seems likely that those who could afford individual replacements for public goods, such as private education, home and work security systems and officers, would often choose the private option and try to avoid contribution to the funds for the public good. The poor who cannot afford these services then go without education or safety from crime and the division between the affluent and the poor widens. Furthermore in societies with diversity the creation of several subgroups as opposed to one, unified society could serve to undermine the creation of a public willing to provide funding for the public good and work with the other subgroups to provide the public good for everyone. The problem with public goods is not simply that they must be argued for but that the public good requires a public concerned with the interests of the society as a whole, not just their individual interests which may conflict with the needs of the society as a whole.
Assuming there is a cohesive group who in general have the same needs and interests there are still fundamental questions that must be addressed in shaping and funding public goods. Galbraith cites, “the ancient and unresolvable question of whether the rich are too rich” as a fundamental problem that arises in determining how and whether to fund public goods (Galbraith 227). The unresolvability of the question of how to fund public goods ties the issue of funding to the unresolvable issue of when social balance is achieved. Galbraith states, “at what point may we conclude that balance has been achieved in the satisfaction of private and public needs. The answer is that no test can be applied, for none exists.” describing the issue of funding. The text presents the issue of social balance as being impossible to call into question the way in which social balance is conceived of as being important and the means which are typically employed to achieve social balance. This questioning of the system of social balance is not idle, rather it is designed to impel the sympathetic, liberal reader into finding the political and economic willpower to overturn the current lack of meaningful action to address poverty in a society of staggering wealth.
This argument is made by examples and descriptions which are assumed to be easily relatable to the readers’ understanding of the modern affluent society. The need for police protection, hospitals, and schools are easily understandable, at least in the abstract. Galbraith describes liberal conventional wisdom as believing that poverty must be addressed and that the government through social programs which create social balance to address inequalities. The readers are expected to follow this conventional wisdom and from the hopelessness presented by the current conventional wisdom find new ways of addressing inequality. This chapter address the problems with the use of the conventional wisdom to solve problems of inequality and poverty. The Affluent Society presents a theory of how thoughts in society work and why what is seemingly desired by the conventional wisdom, of liberals at least, is not completed. This chapter explains how the conventional wisdom and approaches to solve the recognized problem of poverty actually prevents the substantive changes the prevailing societal ideas, social wisdom, advocate for. “The Redress of Balance” acts to push us from the ineffectiveness of our current ideas for redressing poverty into new ideas that have the affects in society we call for, rather than just being satisfying in the abstract, intellectual realm, through illustration of the failure of the current framework of ideas on addressing poverty.
Saturday, March 6, 2010
Thursday, March 4, 2010
Don't Forget, EVERYONE Who Has Not Yet Posted A Precis Must Do So Before Our Next Class Meeting
If you have already posted a precis, you need not post another -- although you can do so if you choose -- and if you would prefer to post a precis by next class on some other text or some dimension of a text we have already read but not discussed you can e-mail me to tell me your idea and I will probably approve it... but come what may, everybody else needs to post a precis here by midnight Monday, say, at the latest. Don't put it off.
Join the Courage Campaign in Supporting an Oil Severance Tax to Fund Higher Education in California
Stand up for students: Pledge to support AB 656
Students across California are protesting against the 30% fee hikes and cuts to classes they have experienced at our public colleges and universities. These cuts and fee increases are making it more difficult for students to afford a quality education. Without good public colleges and universities, California will struggle to create and keep the creative and high-tech jobs that will power our economic recovery.
That's why the Courage Campaign is joining Assemblymember Alberto Torrico, the California Faculty Association and the University of California Students Association to launch a campaign to pass AB 656, the Oil and Gas Severance Tax to fund higher education. It would help roll back the fee increases by restoring over $2 billion in funding to public colleges and universities. AB 656 makes large oil companies pay their fair share in taxes, just as they do in Texas and Alaska.
Please join the Courage Campaign, CFA and UCSA and pledge to support AB 656.
Students shouldn't have to worry about being able to afford staying in school just so oil companies can get a huge tax break:We, the undersigned, are united in our resolve to resist the destruction of California's public colleges and universities. Skyrocketing fees and tuition and cuts to instruction are driving qualified students away from school and jeopardizing our state's future economic growth.
Meanwhile, oil companies are making record profits on the oil they already extract from the ground in California. It is time we joined Texas and Alaska in charging oil companies for their existing oil drilling and use that money to reverse the fee increases and budget cuts at our public colleges and universities.
We pledge to support AB 656 -- the Oil and Gas Severance Tax Act -- and restore affordability to public higher education in California.
Altars and Alters... in Cyberspace!
Monday, March 1, 2010
Sunday, February 28, 2010
Precis: MLK Jr.'s "A Time to Break Silence"
In contrast with "Report from Iron Mountain," in which Lewin Leopold unsuccessfully employs the rhetorical device of satire to explore attitudes concerning the concept of peace /war and critique "superficial logic" of "think tanks," MLK Jr. takes a different avenue or rhetorical approach when discussing peace in "A Time to Break Silence." Unlike Leopold's piece, which NYTimes critic Robert Lekachman states is "conscientiously devoid of personal style or picturesque phrasing," MLK Jr.'s straightforward, powerful speech exudes MLK Jr.'s personal flavor and rhetorical genius. In an effort to better understand how MLK Jr.'s speech is functioning and why it is so compelling and enormously influential, I will take you through a navigation of "A Time to Break Silence." In tracing the trajectory of his argument, I will chart some of his central rhetorical moves, such as his thesis, intended audience, historical narratization, juxtaposition of figures, use of anaphora and pathos appeal, and "Othering." In rhetorically dissecting MLK Jr.'s speech and mapping out the salient contours of his argument, I will stitch together my idiosyncratic relation to the text. (Before I lead you through a navigation of the text, I am compelled to make a disclaimer: my precis only begins to scratch the surface of MLK Jr.'s speech, which is pregnant with rhetorical goodies-- so do read his speech if you have not already done so because it is absolutely brilliant)
At the beginning of his speech, MLK Jr. informs the audience of his location, as well as his purpose for speaking: he is at the meeting of Clergy and Laity Concerned at Riverside Church in New York City because he is in "deepest agreement with the aims of their work and organization concerning Vietnam." Though he does not explicitly state his thesis, he hints that his speech will serve as an expansion and extension of the committee's opening lines: "A time comes when silence is betrayal." His thesis concerns his aim to "make a passionate plea to'' his country to "move past indecision to action" and "find new ways to speak for peace and Vietnam and justice throughout the developing world." Though we might assume his thesis is limited to the discussion of Vietnam, it is not. Towards the end of his speech, we see that Martin Luther King Jr. makes an interesting move: his plea transcends the specific discussion of Vietnam, opening up to discuss a "genuine revolution of values" where "every nation must now develop an overriding loyalty to mankind.. an all-embracing and unconditional love for all men" While his argument starts out as a call for action in Vietnam, MLK opens up the discussion to call for a "revolution of values" and international "fellowship of brotherhood." Although MLK Jr. genuinely wants to persuade the US citizens to mobilize and stop the Vietnam war, he also uses the subject of Vietnam as a vehicle to express his vision of a moral universe that is centered around peace, justice, security, and equality. MLK Jr.'s speech is two-fold with respect to its content matter, as well its historical and temporal specificity.
After delineating this elastic thesis, MLK Jr. explicitly informs us of his intended audience in the seventh paragraph. When discussing his intended audience, MLK Jr. employs a tactic that he frequently uses (as seen in his definition of "love"): he negates several subjects as candidates of his intended audience before unveiling his positive description of his intended audience. In other words, he emphasizes that he was not at the meeting to speak to "Hanoi or the National Liberation.. nor to China or Russia..." After establishing who he is not addressing, he finally informs us that his target audience is his "fellow Americans." By using a negative form of argumentation, MLK Jr. builds up suspense, directly capturing the attention of American citizens. He heightens their complicity in the Vietnam war using this tactic, setting the stage to unravel the rest of his argument, which is a "call to action."
After "calling out" his "fellow Americans," MLK Jr. delineates a blueprint of the 7 major reasons to bring the Vietnam war to end based on his moral vision: "Since I am a preacher by calling, I suppose it is not surprising that I have seven major reasons for bringing Vietnam into the field of my moral vision." In making this statement at the beginning of the paragraph, MLK Jr. establishes a structure to his speech, providing guidance to his listeners and readers about the purpose and direction of his argument. This organization and guidance is especially important for MLK Jr.'s project. The success of his speech partly depends on this moment, when MLK Jr. is attempting to provide justification for his role in speaking out against Vietnam and establish credibility so that his audience will be receptive to his ideas. In an effort to effectively pre-empt and refute possible criticism, establish his credibility, and reassert his moral vision, MLK Jr. makes a self-conscious movement by plotting these reasons (which I have synthesized):
1)He believed that the Vietnam war undercuts his civil rights struggle, as the war took away vital resources from programs for the poor ("I knew that America would never invest the necessary funds or energies in rehabilitation of its poor so long as adventures like Vietnam continued to draw men and skills and money like some demonic destructive suction tube").
2) He wanted to draw attention to and speak out against "the cruel irony of watching Negro and white boys on TV screens as they kill and die together for a nation that has been unable to seat them together in the same schools"
3) He believed that change in America would come through non-violenct action. For the sake of the "life and health of America," he thought it was his duty to speak out against the violence of the oppressed. ("Now, it should be incandescently clear that no one who has any concern for the integrity and life of America today can ignore the present war")
4) As a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, he believed it was his commission to work beyond national allegiances for the "brotherhood of man."
5) Because he had a commitment to the ministry of Jesus Christ and because he shared with all men the calling to be a son of living God, he had this vocation of sonship and brotherhood that is "beyond the calling of race or nation or creed"
6) He speaks the voice for the voiceless of Vietnam, for the "people who have been living under the curse of war for almost three continuous decades now"
7) He speaks out because "he is deeply concerned about the American troops" ("Before long they must know that their government has sent them into a struggle among Vietnamese, and the more sophisticated surely realize that we are on the side of the wealthy, and the secure, while we create a hell for the poor")
After mapping out his reasons for speaking that night, in which he explains that he has a vocation of "sonship and brotherhood that extends beyond national borders," MLK Jr. paints a historical narrative of the Vietnamese people, who he frames as "our brothers." In fleshing out a historical narrative of the Vietnamese people and their struggle for independence from oppressive forces, MLK Jr. reminds American citizens that it was the "intervention of deadly Western arrogance" that led to the current situation, as the US rejected the revolutionary government seeking self-determination in Vietnam and "supported French in their abortive effort to recolonize Vietnam." In painting an overarching narrative, MLK Jr. positions the audience to understand the broad scope of the conflict and their complicity in the story. In addition to using the rhetorical tactic of framing and "narrativization," MLK Jr. emphasizes the US's, and by association the US citizens, responsibility in the war by employing the figure of the bomb. In my opinion, MLK Jr. creates a particularly powerful moment when he juxtaposes the image of the leaflet and bomb: "All the while the people read our leaflets and received the regular promises of peace and democracy and land reform. Now they languish under our bombs and consider us, not their fellow Vietnamese, the real enemy." In juxtaposing these images-- one that represents our motivating ideals as liberators and the other that represents our destructive reality as aggressors--, MLK Jr. underscores the hypocritical status of the US. MLK Jr. successfully juxtaposes these images to convey a biting and poignant criticism.
In addition to employing the technique of "narrativization" and juxtaposition of figures, MLK Jr. also employs a pathos argument when fleshing out a portrait of the everyday lives of women, children, and aged who: "watch as we poison their water, as we kill a million acres of their crops. They must weep as the bulldozers roar through their areas preparing to destroy the precious trees. They wander into the hospitals with at least twenty casualties from American firepower for one Vietcong-inflicted injury... They wander into the towns and see thousands of the children, homeless, without clothes, running in packs on the streets like animals. They see the children degraded by our soldiers as they beg for food. They see the children selling their sisters to our soldiers, soliciting for their mothers." With this description, which spells out the horrors and suffering the Vietnamese children and women experience, MLK Jr. makes a pathos appeal-- or rather, an appeal to the audience's sympathies and imagination. In mobilizing a pathos appeal, MLK Jr. makes the lived situation of the Vietnamese children and women less abstract and more palpable. In this section, MLK Jr. makes his pathos appeal more forceful with his adept handing of the rhetorical figure "Anaphora," or the repitition of a phrase at the beginning of sentences. In employing the repitition of phrase "they see," MLK Jr. emphasizes that "they"-- the Vietnamese" see the pain and destruction, but "we," the US citizens, who are inflicting the harm, do not see. In emphasizing the fact that we Americans do not see, MLK Jr. enhances the guilt and sympathy that US citizens should feel. MLK Jr. mobilizes anaphora again when explaining how "we have": "destroyed their two most cherished institutions: the family and the village. We have destroyed their land and their crops. We have cooperated in the crushing of -- in the crushing of the nation's only noncommunist revolutionary political force, the unified Buddhist Church. We have supported the enemies of the peasants of Saigon. We have corrupted their women and children and killed their men." In using repitition of sequences of "we have" after the "they see" sequences, MLK Jr. highlights our role in the destruction of Vietnamese lives. He uses the combination of the pathos appeal and anaphora to frame the situation and key players (Vietnamese="good guys" and US="bad guys") in an effort to awaken the US citizens' slumbering consciences and incite action to pull out of Vietnam.
To further emphasize the US citizen's complicity in the destruction of Vietnamese lives, MLK Jr. assumes the enemies-- the "Others"--point of view. He makes a self conscious movement, stating that he will assume "their" perspective ' so that "we may indeed see the basic weaknesses of our own condition, and if we are mature, we may learn and grow and profit from the wisdom of the brothers who are called the opposition." He fleshes out the Hanoi's perspective to remind the US citizen of the complicated, complex situation of the war, where much of the culpability for the war resides not with the Hanoi, but western aggressors. MLK Jr. reminds US citizens that the situation in Vietnam can not be reduced to a simple scenario or simple characterizations. We can not succumb to the logical fallacy of giving the enemy a "blanket name:" "How do they judge us when our officials know that their membership is less than twenty-five percent communist, and yet insist on giving them the blanket name?" In fleshing out the nuances of the situation, in which MLK Jr. reminds Americans of their own responsibility in the war and warns them against falling into the trap of creating fallacious schemas, MLK Jr. tries to make clear the reasons why the Hanoi "do not leap to negotiate." He even employs the tactic of "rhetorical questions"-- asking a host of rhetorical questions such as "What must they think of the United States of America when they realize that we permitted the repression and cruelty of Diem, which helped to bring them into being as a resistance group in the South?"--- to get us to "understand their feelings, even if we do not condone their actions; to see that the men we supported pressed them to their violence; to see that our own computerized plans of destruction simply dwarfed their greatest acts." In assuming the voice of the "Other" to tease out the complexities of the conflict in Vietnam, MLK Jr. bulldozes the blanket image of the "enemy," showing Americans another reason why they should mobilize action to stop the war. His rhetorical tactic of reverse "Othering" serves to buttress his overall aim in the speech.
Finally, after delineating an arsenal of reasons why Vietnam is in his moral vision and mobilizing reasons why we should pull out, MLK Jr. cuts to the heart of his argument: the US needs to be stop being silent and start being "mature." The US needs to take responsibility for its mistake in entering the war and for its destruction of Vietnamese homes, culture, and lives. The US must pull out of the war. MLK Jr. explicitly enumerates a road map for how we can "atone for our sins," calling for five concrete things that the government "should do immediately to begin the long and difficult process of extricating ourselves from this nightmarish conflict": 1) an end to all bombing in Vietnam 2) unilateral cease fire 3) prevention of battle grounds in Southeast Asia 4) recognition of National Liberation Front 5) a set date from removal of all foreign forces from Vietnam in accordance with the 1954 Geneva Convention. Before "stopping there," however, MLK Jr. proceeds to say something that is "even more disturbing."
At this point in the speech, we see an interesting thing happen-- this is where the second part of his thesis unfolds. MLK Jr. shifts from talking to Vietnam and elaborates on "the deeper malady within the American spirit," of which the war in Vietnam is a symptom. After explaining how the US's pattern of suppression in the international domain and the privileging of "things" over "people" leads to the dominance of the "giant triplets of racism, extreme materialism and militarism," MLK Jr. states that "we as a nation must undergo a radical revolution of values." For three paragraphs, MLK Jr. teases out how America can lead a "true revolution of values." He even states that "there is nothing except a tragic death wish to prevent us from reordering our priorities so that the pursuit of peace will take precedence over the pursuit of war." Although it may seem subtle at first and susceptible to a quickly glossed over reading, MLK Jr. states that the US is headed for "spiritual" death if it fails to re-prioritize its values. As we learned in rhetoric 10, MLK Jr. at this point in the text employs the language of violence to promote non-violence. In addition to using the language of violence, MLK Jr. also aligns the positive revolution of values with the fight against Communism, stating that "we must not engage in a negative anti-communism, but rather in a positive thrust for democracy, realizing that our greatest defense against communism is to take offensive action in behalf of justice." At this point in the text, MLK Jr. is making an interesting move, attempting to alter the "Cold War" mentality by illustrating that democracy-- and the fight against poverty, injustice, and insecurity-- is the best means in fighting against communism. Instead of remaining "complacent," MLK Jr. argues that the US should "recapture the revolutionary spirit" and make a commitment to "go into a sometimes hostile world declaring eternal hostility to poverty racism and militarism." In his effort to incite action, MLK Jr. mobilizes the language of revolution, tapping in to Americans' sentiment of their revolutionary origins. Instead of being anti-revolutionaries, he urges the US to lead the way and support the men who are revolting against the system of exploitation and oppression.
After urging the US to lead a revolution in values, MLK Jr. extends the discussion of "revolution of values" to address the world: "A genuine revolution of values means in the final analysis that our loyalties must become ecumenical rather than sectional...This call for a worldwide fellowship that lifts neighborly concern beyond one's tribe, race, class, and nation is in reality a call for an all-embracing and unconditional love for all mankind." After explaining his vision of "worldwide fellowship," in which he redefines love as the "force which all of the great religions have seen as the supreme unifying principle of life," MLK Jr. reminds listeners of the urgency of the matter at hand. He cleverly weaves in the concept of time to rally momentum for action. After introducing the concept of time, MLK Jr. confronts listeners with a choice: "nonviolent coexistence or violent co-annihilation." MLK Jr. plays on listener's mounting guilt, saying if we don't act or make the right choice, America will be dragged into "shameful corridors." After building up the weight and urgency of the decision at hand, MLK ends (and softens) his speech with a poem by James Russell Lowell, which addresses the issues of a once-in-a-lifetime decision, love not war, good not evil, light not darkness, and God's watchful eye over his people.
In stitching together my own preoccupations with MLK Jr.'s "A Time to Break Silence," I hope to have delineated the salient features of this text and elucidated some of MLK's brilliant rhetorical maneuvers. In tracing his rhetorical maneuvers, I am particularly impressed with the different folds of MLK Jr.'s argument. In other words, I am impressed with how he took a subject matter--the Vietnam War-- and opened it up as a space to discuss a host of issues, such as the fight for justice at home, the US's need for a "revolution of values," and an international "fellowship of brotherhood." It is MLK Jr.'s rhetorical prowess that has enabled this speech, which began as a call to action to stop war in Vietnam, to transcend its historical location and ossify as a monument to "world peace and justice."
For me--especially after reading Leonard Lewin's "Report from Cold Mountain" and Eisenhower's "Farewell Speech"-- this text was enormously enjoyable to read. Did you guys have the same experience? Also, were than any rhetorical operations in this piece that others found particularly interesting, brilliant, strange, etc?